Revitalizing Regulation by Farber, Daniel A.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 91 Issue 6 
1993 
Revitalizing Regulation 
Daniel A. Farber 
University of Minnesota 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel A. Farber, Revitalizing Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1278 (1993). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol91/iss6/16 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
REVITALIZING REGULATION 
Daniel A. Farber* 
REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: How THE ENTREPRENEURIAL 
SPIRIT Is TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR. By David Osborne 
and Ted Gaebler. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. 
1992. Pp. xxii, 405. $22.95. 
RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE 
AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE. By Susan Rose-Ackerman. New 
York: The Free Press. Pp. xiii, 301. $24.95. 
The Reagan presidency was a watershed in the history of Ameri-
can government. For the first time since Hoover, a president was ac-
tively hostile to the modem administrative state, elected on a platform 
of "less government." Today, the call for reduced government seems 
less compelling; we have rediscovered the existence of pressing social 
problems that seem to require a government response. Yet the Rea-
gan-era critique has destroyed liberal complacency about govern-
ment's ability to solve social problems. As Bill Clinton says on the 
jacket of Reinventing Government, even the administrative state's sup-
porters now believe that "[t]hose of us who want to revitalize govern-
ment in the 1990s are going to have to reinvent it." 
Reinventing Government and Rethinking the Progressive Agenda 
are efforts to move beyond the Reagan era without returning to dis-
credited visions of government. Both could be considered ncoliberal: 
they propose major reforms rather than defending the pre-Reagan ad-
ministrative state. Many of their proposals adapt "conservative" ideas 
- cost-benefit analysis, competition, privatization - to serve the lib-
eral goals of increased government effectiveness and efficiency. Ulti-
mately, neither book truly provides what Clinton calls a "blueprint" 
for reinventing the administrative state. Nevertheless, they do contain 
provocative new ideas for improving the operation of government. 
Both books discuss an enormous range of government policies. In-
stead of attempting to match their sweep, this review will use environ-
mental regulation as the context for exploring their ideas. First, 
however, a brief overview of both books is in order. 
Of the two books, Reinventing Government is the less convention-
* Associate Dean for Faculty and Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minne· 
sota. B.A. 1971, M.A. 1972, J.D. 1975, University of Illinois. - Ed. I would like to thank Dan 
Gilford and Kathryn Nickles for their helpful comments. 
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ally academic. Its authors, David Osbome1 and Ted Gaebler,2 pro-
vide the same kind of breezy management advice found in books like 
In Search of Excellence. 3 Trying to bring Japanese business methods 
to bear on American governmental institutions, they advocate replac-
ing rigid hierarchies with more entrepreneurial, team-oriented man-
agement. The book features relatively few footnotes and statistics. 
Instead, Osborne and Gaebler present a series of inspiring stories 
about innovative officials who transformed moribund programs into 
successful operations. Often, these officials began by trying to identify 
their organization's "customers," determining the customers' needs, 
and then insisting that the organization find a way to meet those 
needs. The stories are probably oversimplified,4 but they do communi-
cate the novel idea that government can be exciting and creative. 5 
Rethinking the Progressive Agenda, by Susan Rose-Ackerman,6 is a 
more traditional work of scholarship. Professor Rose-Ackerman's im-
pressive knowledge of regulatory policy and economic theory animate 
her commentary on the problems of the modem administrative state. 
She offers thoughtful observations about topics ranging from the Tak-
ings Clause7 to funding mechanisms for government services. 8 She de-
votes much of her attention to improving the rationality of 
government decisionmaking; she proposes increased use of cost-benefit 
analysis and more vigorous judicial review (p. 191). But other impor-
tant parts of her book Oike Osborne and Gaebler's) focus on the design 
of implementation mechanisms.9 
1. Consultant to state and local governments, freelance writer. 
2. Consultant and former city manager. 
3. THOMAS J. PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, JR., IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE: LES-
SONS FROM AMERICA'S BEST-RUN COMPANIES (1982). 
4. For criticisms of some of these stories, see James Fallows, A Case for Reform, THE AT-
LANTIC, June 1992, at 119, 122-23 (reviewing DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENT-
ING GOVERNMENT: How THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT Is TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR). A number of the stories relate to George Latimer's innovations as mayor of St. Paul. 
Seep. 399 for 13 index entries. As a Minneapolis resident, my general sense is that Latimer was 
a very successful mayor but not the miracle worker portrayed by Osborne and Gaebler. St. Paul 
continues to face some serious problems, and some of Latimer's programs have not proved suc-
cessful. See Joe Kimball, Geurin the Younger Keeping Watch on City Great-Great-Great Helped 
Found, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Apr. 30, 1992, at Bl. 
5. They almost succeeded in making even the lowly administrative job of associate law school 
dean seem potentially interesting, at least for a few brief minutes. If exciting innovations are 
possible in city sanitation departments and military supply operations, one might almost think it 
possible to improve the delivery of services to law students. 
6. Richard S. Ely Professor of Law and Political Economy, Yale University. 
7. Chapter nine of the book presents a useful overview of economic analyses of the Takings 
Clause. Pp. 132-49. 
8. Rose-Ackerman presents an intriguing discussion of the possibility of using better-in-
formed "shoppers" for public services as proxies to ensure delivery of quality government serv-
ices. Pp. 97-117. 
9. Unlike Osborne and Gaebler, who generally simply assume that the government's pur-
poses are beneficent, Rose-Ackerman devotes considerable attention to the potential defects of 
the political process. In chapters four and five, she makes some suggestions intended to improve 
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These aspects of Rose-Ackerman's work exemplify two rather dif-
ferent approaches to improving public administration. Part I of this 
review discusses the older of the two approaches, which Rose-Acker-
man calls policy analysis. This approach calls for greater use of eco-
nomic analysis in making substantive decisions, with judicial review 
furnishing quality control on the technical aspects of decisionmaking. 
The organizational form corresponding to this model of decisionmak-
ing is the conventional hierarchy, of the kind Osborne and Gaebler 
condemn, in which information flows to the top and decisions flow 
back down. Part II turns to a newer approach, which focuses on the 
design of implementation mechanisms; here, the paradigm is probably 
the marketable pollution permit. Part II explores how better mecha-
nism design, of the kind both Rose-Ackerman and Osborne and 
Gaebler advocate, might be used to improve environmental law. 
While marketable permits are promising, we need to consider 
other ways to decentralize regulation. Although neither book ad-
dresses other possible methods of environmental protection, their 
themes inspire a search for new possibilities. One option is delegating 
more discretion over permits to the states while using modern meth-
ods of statistical quality control to improve the state's performance. 
Another option is a form of "result driven" delegation, in which se-
lected states would contract out of the normal regulatory regime, 
guaranteeing in return to achieve specified, measurable improvements 
in environmental quality. An improved regulatory process also might 
well involve less judicial oversight. 
I. THE "OLD" POLICY ANALYSIS: FORMALIZED 
DECISIONMAKING 
As part of her program to improve administrative rationality, Pro-
fessor Rose-Ackerman recommends expanded agency reliance on cost-
benefit analysis in promulgating regulations (pp. 33-34, 37, 39). As 
she recognizes, regulatory schemes often lack firm statutory bases for 
cost-benefit analysis. In the environmental area, for example, few stat-
utes require regulators to perform cost-benefit analysis. Nevertheless, 
Rose-Ackerman argues that, in the absence of specific language 
prohibiting the use of cost-benefit analysis, courts should require agen-
cies to engage in "net benefit maximization" (which is just another 
name for cost-benefit analysis). 
Rose-Ackerman's enthusiasm for cost-benefit analysis is strong 
the public accountability of the process. (For a critique of her proposals, see Book Note, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1402 (1992).) Her primary concern is seemingly that members of the public find 
it rationally undesirable to be fully informed about the government's actions, creating an oppor· 
tunity for officials to pursue less noble goals. Pp 35, 51-53, 62. In the environmental area, at 
least, some of these information problems seem to have been neutralized through the use of 
environmental groups as information brokers. See Daniel Farber, Politics ond Procedure in Envi· 
ronmenta/ Law, 8 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 59 (1992). 
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enough to overcome highly unfavorable statutory language. For ex-
ample, she criticizes the Supreme Court for failing to require cost-ben-
efit analysis for OSHA toxics regulations (pp. 93-94), yet the statute 
clearly precludes her proposed result. The Act mandates that OSHA 
choose the standard that "most adequately assures, to the extent feasi-
ble ... that no employee will suffer material impairment of health."10 
Rose-Ackerman's effort to expand cost-benefit analysis is thus some-
what dubious as a matter of statutory interpretation.11 Moreover, as 
we will see, cost-benefit analysis is not really capable of playing the 
decisive role she desires for it. 
A. The Practical Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
As Rose-Ackerman explains, cost-benefit analysis came to Wash-
ington with Bob McNamara and his "Whiz Kids" at the Defense De-
partment (p. 15). Since then, the executive branch has increasingly 
applied cost-benefit analysis in policymaking. President Reagan's fa-
mous Executive Order 12,291, issued in 1981, requires agencies issuing 
"major rules" to conduct a cost-benefit analysis to ensure that the ben-
efits of a proposed regulation outweigh its costs.12 Executive Order 
12,291 effectively provides a cost-benefit overlay for all major federal 
regulatory actions. 13 The renewed emphasis on cost-benefit analysis 
found its administrative incarnation in the increasingly powerful su-
pervisory role of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) over 
EPA and other agencies. 
More recently, George Bush imposed a ninety-day moratorium on 
new regulations. Agencies were instructed to review existing regula-
10. OSHA§ 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1989); see American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Dono-
van, 452 U.S. 490, 509 (1981) (rejecting cost-benefit analysis as inconsistent with the plain lan-
guage of § 6(b )(5)). 
11. For a critique of a similar approach to statutory interpretation (discussing some of the 
same cases as Rose-Ackerman), see Daniel Farber, Playing the Baseline: Civil Rights, Environ-
mental Law, and Statutory Interpretation, 91 CoLUM. L. RE.v. 676, 695-700 (1991) (reviewing 
CASS SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RE.CONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 
(1990)). 
12. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981). The Order defines major rule as a regula-
tion likely to produce, inter alia, an annual impact of $100 million or more on the American 
economy or a major increase in costs or prices. Id. 
13. For example, the Clean Air Act requires that EPA set primary air quality standards for 
criteria pollutants based solely on the level necessary to protect human health. Clean Air Act 
§ 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988). The Agency is not allowed to consider costs in promulgating 
these standards. Nonetheless, EPA must conduct the "Regulatory Impact Analysis" (cost-bene-
fit analysis) required by Executive Order No. 12,291. EPA internal rules say the RIA must 
explicitly state that cost-benefit analysis cannot be used to determine the standard. OFFICE OF 
POLICY ANALYSIS, EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PERFORMING REGULATORY ANALYSES, EPA RE.-
PORT No. 230-01-84-003 (1983). Once the analysis becomes part of the record, however, it tends 
to influence the decision. See generally Ann Fisher, An Overview and Evaluation of EPA 's Guide-
lines for Conducting Regulatory Impact Analysis, in v. KERRY SMITH, ENVIRONMENTAL POL-
ICY UNDER REAGAN'S EXECUTIVE ORDER 99 (1984). 
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tions during the moratorium and to ensure compliance with the fol-
lowing standards (among others): 
(a) The expected benefits to society of any regulation should clearly 
outweigh the expected costs it imposes on society. 
(b) Regulations should be fashioned to maximize net benefits to 
society.14 
The Bush order seemed on its face directly responsive to Rose-Acker-
man's demand for "net benefit" analysis. 
Although a heated philosophical debate has raged about whether 
cost-benefit analysis should dictate regulatory policy, 15 the debaters 
seem to have overlooked a more basic point. Experience shows that, 
in the most interesting, controversial cases, cost-benefit analysis could 
not dictate an answer even if we wanted it to do so. Except in extreme 
cases, the result of a cost-benefit analysis often turns on a series of 
discretionary judgments; competent, reasonable analysts can come up 
with quite different but equally defensible answers. Toxic substance 
control, now the subject of a large and rapidly growing body of federal 
regulation, exemplifies the difficulties encountered by honest cost-ben-
efit analysts. Several steps in the process are particularly imprecise. 
Valuation is a key step in conducting a cost-benefit analysis, 16 
which requires that future benefits be expressed in monetary terms. 
For goods freely traded on the market, determining monetary value is 
straightforward. For "nonmarket goods" like human life (or the in-
herent value people place on the existence of other species), however, 
14. Memorandum on Reducing the Burden of Government Regulation, 28 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. Doc. 232, 233 (Jan. 25, 1992). President Bush later announced strict timetables and pro-
gress report requirements for reviews of existing regulations and an extended moratorium on new 
regulations to enhance compliance with the new directive. He also directed agencies to conduct 
cost-benefit analyses to identify reforms that could be accomplished without additional legisla-
tion. Memorandum on Implementing Regulatory Reforms, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 728 
(Apr. 29, 1992). 
15. Mark Sagoff is a particularly sharp critic. See, e.g., MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF 
THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LA w AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1988); Mark SagolT, Economic The-
ory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1393 (1981). But see Carol M. Rose, Environ-
mental Faust Succumbs to Temptations of Economic Mephistopheles, or. Value by Any Other 
Name Is Preference, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1631 (1989) (reviewing SAGOFF, supra); Christopher H. 
Schroeder, In the Regulation of Manmade Carcinogens, If Feasibility Analysis Is the Answer, 
What Is the Question?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1483 (1990) (reviewing FRANK B. CROSS, ENVIRON-
MENTALLY INDUCED CANCER AND THE LAW (1989)). 
16. Valuation depends on interested parties' subjective (and often hypothetical) willingness 
to pay for the program benefits at issue. One basic difficulty with willingness to pay as a measure 
is its dependence on the initial assignment of rights. Generally, people will require a larger 
payment to relinquish a right than they will pay to acquire that right. See JONATHAN BARON, 
THINKING AND DECIDING 436-38 (1988). One reason is that possession of an entitlement in-
creases an individual's total wealth and therefore her willingness to pay for goods. Thus, in order 
to determine willingness to pay, the decisionmaker must first decide whether an individual al-
ready has a right to the good in question. In the asbestos situation, for example, the policymaker 
would need to determine in advance whether individuals already possess a right to a healthful, 
asbestos-free environment. Similarly, if a cost-benefit analysis were conducted to decide whether 
to save the whales, the result could tum on whether the initial entitlement was assigned to the 
whalers or Greenpeace. 
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assignment of a monetary value is much more controversial. Much of 
today's regulation involves nonmonetary benefits and therefore raises 
precisely these valuation problems. For instance, federal agencies 
have imputed values to human life ranging from $70,000 to $132 mil-
lion.17 Even apart from the difficulty of placing a dollar value on life, 
overall reductions in the levels of human mortality may not fully cap-
ture the benefits of toxics regulation. Other characteristics of risks, 
such as clustering of victims, may also matter. 18 Moreover, regula-
tions may have important incidental benefits, which may resist quanti-
fication even more stubbornly. The policy analyst tends to ignore 
these "soft variables,"19 precluding a truly complete analysis. 
After monetization of the benefits, the next problem is setting the 
discount rate, so as to factor in the delay in receiving the benefits. 
Placing a value on human life or some other "intangible" is hard 
enough, but additional complexities arise when the benefits of a regu-
lation will not occur for many years. For example, because govern-
ment regulation of carcinogens cannot be expected to affect the cancer 
rate for twenty or thirty years,20 the choice of discount rates has dra-
matic implications for toxics regulation. To illustrate, suppose we 
value each life saved at $1 million, but expect the regulation's benefits 
to accrue in twenty years. The present value we should place on a life 
saved twenty years from now is only $150,000,21 if we use OMB's ten 
17. CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & THOMAS D. HOPKINS, FEDERAL AGENCY VALUATIONS OF 
HUMAN LIFE, A REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 2 
(1988), reprinted in 1988 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOM-
MENDATIONS AND REPORTS 367, 369 (citing OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REGU-
LATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 1987-88). Another study by Kip 
Viscusi found a slightly narrower range among federal agencies using labor market studies as a 
basis for the value assigned to lives saved. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Valuation of Risks to Life 
and Health, in JUDITH BENTKOVER ET AL., BENEFITS AsSESSMENT: THE STATE OF THE ART 
200-02 (1986). For a cogent recent overview, see Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Value of Life, 38 
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 209 (1990). Similar problems exist in determining how to assess the value 
that people place on the continued existence of an endangered species apart from the species' 
direct usefulness to humans. For an exchange about the appropriateness of including those valu-
ations in cost-benefit analysis, see Donald Rosenthal & Robert Nelson, Why Existence Value 
Should Not Be Used in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 11 J. POLY. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 116 (1992); Ray-
mond J. Kopp, Why Existence Value Should Be Used in Cost Benefit Analysis, 11 J. POLY. ANAL-
YSIS & MGMT. 123 (1992). 
18. See, e.g., Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of 
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 584-629 (1992). 
19. See Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & Pua. AFF. 66 
(1972). 
20. EPA estimates the "latency" period for asbestos-related lung cancer at 20 years from the 
time of exposure and the latency period for asbestos-related mesothelioma at 25-30 years. Final 
Rule: Asbestos Manufacture, Importation, Processing and Distribution in Commerce Prohibi-
tions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,469 (1989). 
21. OMB's recent proposed reduction of the regulatory discount rate to seven percent would 
mean OMB would calculate the value of the life in 20 years at $260,000. See Guidelines and 
Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, 57 Fed. Reg. 35,613, 35,614 
(1992). 
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percent annual "discount rate."22 The discount rate has even greater 
impact on long-term global environmental issues such as the ozone 
layer and the greenhouse effect.23 For projects with "long tails," a 
change of even a few percentage points can have a substantial impact 
on results. 24 
Although cost-benefit analysis of environmental regulation clearly 
involves serious technical problems of valuation and discounting, 
quantitative estimates of risk often involve even more speculation. Be-
cause of the limited nature of current scientific knowledge, we often 
can do little more than make educated guesses about a chemical's ef-
fects on human health (or about other environmental problems like 
the greenhouse effect). For estimates to vary over an entire order of 
magnitude or more is not unusual. 25 
Because of these uncertainties, cost-benefit analysis is best at iden-
tifying highly promising projects or ruling out extremely poor ones.26 
Rose-Ackerman acknowledges that "cost-benefit analysis cannot al-
ways be carried out with precision" (p. 39). But in areas like toxics 
regulation, this is a dramatic understatement. In this area, uncertain-
ties multiply quickly. Given estimates of the value of life that vary by 
about a factor of five, discount rates that can cause answers to differ by 
a factor of two, and risk estimates that differ by an order of magnitude 
or more, estimates of regulatory benefits can vary by two orders of 
22. OMB Circular A-94, at 4 (1972). For an introductory treatment, see ZYGMUNT PLATER 
ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 59-63 (1992). Recently, then-Senator Al Gore 
vigorously attacked the use of discounting. See AL GORE, EARTII IN THE BALANCE: EcOLOGY 
AND TIIE HUMAN SPIRIT 190-91 (1992). 
23. See Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J. 
EcoN. LIT. 675, 724-27 (1992) (noting the significance of choosing a discount rate both for 
analysis of carcinogen regulation under CERCLA and RCRA and for global environmental 
issues). 
24. For example, over a 30-year period, the present value of $1 million at a 5% discount rate 
is $230,000, but at a 7% rate it is only $130,000. Thus, over three decades, a 2% difference in 
discount rate translates into a difference of almost 100% in result. For a more detailed discus-
sion of discounting, see Daniel Farber & Paul Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Dis-
count Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 1993). 
25. See, e.g., ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, 
AND POLICY 479 (1992) (Workers exposed to benzene face leukemia risk "ranging from 44 to 
152 per 1,000."); Alon Rosenthal et al., Legislating Acceptable Cancer Risk from Exposure to 
Toxic Chemicals, 19 EcOLOGY L.Q. 269, 287 (1992) (noting that different standard statistical 
models for the dose-response relationship "may yield low-dose risk estimates for the same chemi-
cal, or even from the same data set, that vary enormously, by factors of hundreds or even of 
thousands"); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas D. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for 
Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729, 732 (positing that the vinyl chloride stan-
dard could save one life a year, but that "an estimate of twenty or even forty lives would be ••. 
equally plausible"). Rosenthal et al., supra, conclude that quantitative risk assessment of chemi-
cal carcinogens "is a fragile science that is being pushed, from many directions, to take on some 
very large responsibilities." Id. at 295. 
26. Robert C. Lind, A Primer on the Major Issues Relative to the Discount Rate for Evaluat-
ing National Energy Options, in ROBERT c. LIND ET AL., DISCOUNTING FOR TIME AND RISK IN 
ENERGY POLICY 21, 24 (1982). 
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magnitude.27 One could defensibly estimate the environmental bene-
fits of a regulation at either $10 million or $1 billion. Such a disparity 
is hardly close enough even for government work. 
Toxics regulation may present something of a worst-case scenario 
for cost-benefit analysis, but this is little consolation. Given the degree 
of uncertainty involved, many important decisions fall into the grey 
area in which cost-benefit analysis turns on discretionary technical 
choices. In short, even if we wanted it to provide answers, cost-benefit 
analysis could not provide any assurance of certainty in our compari-
sons of various policy options and their ramifications. 
This does not mean that cost-benefit analysis is useless, but only 
that we should not expect it to do too much. Environmental regula-
tion does involve difficult tradeoffs, and economic analysis, including 
cost-benefit analysis, can help clarify the differences among competing 
policy options. Cost-benefit analysis provides useful information by 
allowing us to compare a proposed regulation with the kinds of trade-
offs made in the private sector (for example, the way that wages in 
high-risk industries reflect the value that workers put on their own 
lives). Despite its imprecision, cost-benefit analysis can also function 
as a form of triage, identifying some highly desirable regulations and 
also some extremely dubious ones, leaving the middle range for further 
consideration. 28 
B. Organizational Implications 
The preceding section asked whether cost-benefit analysis is capa-
ble of producing the kind of answers we would need if we were going 
to make it the controlling standard for regulatory decisions. The Os-
borne and Gaebler book, however, suggests another kind of question: 
Quite apart from its intrinsic qualities, does cost-benefit analysis work 
organizationally? To put it another way, is basing decisions on cost-
benefit analysis a good management technique? Genuine grounds ex-
ist for concern on this score. One of the risks of cost-benefit analysis is 
27. For example, suppose that benefits will be received thirty years in the future, that the risk 
is estimated at between one in a hundred million and one in a million (with a hundred million 
people exposed to the risk), that discount rates of either five or seven percent are used, and that 
the value of life is estimated at between $3 million and $6 million. On these facts the high end 
calculation is one hundred lives saved at $6 million each, which totals $600 million with a pres-
ent value of $138 million. The low end calculation is one $3 million life saved with a present 
value of $490,000. 
28. Economists themselves fully realize the limits of cost-benefit analysis. As Robert Lind 
has written: 
[B]enefit-cost analysis need not and cannot provide precise answers to policy questions. 
Rather it is a procedure that can provide a crude but highly useful picture of the relative 
merits of alternative policies. It therefore can be used to identify those investments that are 
either very good or very bad. Benefit-cost analysis also organizes data that bear on policy 
decisions and does so in a way that educates us about the important elements of a problem 
and allows us to test the sensitivity of the decisions to changes in those elements. 
Lind, supra note 26, at 24. 
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that it may obscure policy choices behind seemingly technical deci-
sions (such as the choice of a discount rate). Another risk may be that 
the locus of decisionmaking is shifted toward OMB and away from 
agencies like EPA. In the view of some observers, at least, OMB may 
have served more as a conduit for crude political pressure from the 
White House than as a source of technical oversight or economics ex-
pertise (Rose-Ackerman, p. 151). 
A more subtle harm may lie in shifting decisions away from offi-
cials with substantive policy expertise to "bean counters" at OMB. 
Cost-benefit analysis reflects a very traditional type of organizational 
structure, in which underlings collect and analyze numerical data that 
provide the basis for a superior's decision. The Osborne and Gaebler 
book raises general questions about the desirability of this kind of 
traditional hierarchy and suggests that we might learn from the pri-
vate sector experience with similar management techniques.29 
In this respect, Robert McNamara's role in bringing cost-benefit 
analysis into federal decisionmaking may teach an important lesson. 
Some evidence suggests that one problem of American industry in the 
past few decades - and of McNamara's legacy at Ford Motor Com-
pany in particular - was a shift in corporate influence from manufac-
turing and sales executives to the finance department. 3° For example, 
Ford's European branch developed an improved method to paint cars 
in 1958, but the method was not fully adopted at Ford's American 
plants until 1984 because of the influence of the "finance men."31 
David Halberstam describes this reason for delay: 
The men who had developed the E-coat [the new painting method] and 
the plant men who pushed for it considered it the key to a great increase 
in quality. Unfortunately, there was no way to quantify that improve-
ment in terms of sales. That it was a much better process no one 
doubted. But when the manufacturing and product men pointed to its 
virtues, the finance men would point to the price. Somehow the manu-
facturing men would be unable to prove that the E-coat would make a $4 
million difference. How, after all, asked one of its proponents, did one 
put a price on a happy customer?32 
In a variety of industries, financial analysts have applied techniques 
29. OMB might be considered the equivalent of the factory inspector, rather than the finance 
department. On that analogy, however, one can still criticize OMB as an example of the outmo· 
ded concept of inspecting quality into products. See E. Donald Elliott, TQMing OMB: Or Why 
Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 12291 Works So Poorly and What President Clinton 
Can Do About It, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 1993). 
This review and Elliot's article both invite the response that business management techniques 
are irrelevant to government. Reinventing Government provides an extended rebuttal to that 
criticism. Nevertheless, the government's substantive goals are likely to differ substantially from 
those of a private firm, and the government must consider equity and process values in addition 
to efficiency. 
30. See DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE RECKONING 213-16, 245-46 (1986). 
31. Id. at 499-501. 
32. Id. at 500. 
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like cost-benefit analysis to justify rejecting bold innovations whose ad-
vocates could not adequately document the potential benefits. 33 While 
assigning the primary blame for the stagnation of some American in-
dustries to corporate "bean counters" would surely be an overstate-
ment, individuals with substantive expertise are surely more likely to 
spur progress. Unfortunately, many companies mistakenly vested 
power in individuals with expertise in economics and finance theory 
who had little commitment to the product or daily operation of the 
business. 34 The analogy to disputes between environmental regulators, 
who claim a new regulation will improve environmental quality, and 
OMB, which objects that the regulators cannot prove the benefits out-
weigh the costs, is obvious. 
During the past decade, the federal government may have been 
replicating an organizational mistake that possibly contributed to the 
decline of key American industries.35 We ought to resist Rose-Acker-
man's suggestion to continue further down this path. Cost-benefit 
analysis should assist rather than control regulatory decisions. 
II. THE "NEW" POLICY ANALYSIS: MECHANISM IMPROVEMENT 
Although expanded use of cost-benefit analysis is probably not the 
answer, our current regulatory system certainly is cumbersome, ex-
pensive, and only moderately eff~ctive. In the environmental area, 
some pollution problems have dramatically improved, while others 
have remained constant or even deteriorated. In the meantime, hun-
dreds of billions of dollars have been spent. 36 Both industry and envi-
ronmentalists should welcome proposals to achieve environmental 
progress more cheaply. 
The question, then, is how to improve regulatory mechanisms. 
33. Consider the following description of the "tyranny of the numbers crunchers" at GM: 
Another form of financial tyranny has been the frequent decision to pinch pennies at the 
expense of product content and design. Cars have often been produced that lack the excit-
ing features once planned because original designs have had to be altered so many times to 
save money. Of course, the Jong-term results of penny-wise-and-pound-foolish car-building 
practices are legendary . • . . 
MARYANN KELLER, RUDE AWAKENING: THE RISE, FALL, AND STRUGGLE FOR RECOVERY 
OF GENERAL MOTORS 28 (1989); see also DOUGLAS K. SMITH & ROBERT c. ALEXANDER, 
FUMBLING THE FUTURE: How XEROX INVENTED, THEN IGNORED, THE FIRST PERSONAL 
COMPUTER 132-36, 153-62, 171, 188, 221 (1988); LESTER C. THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD: THE 
COMING EcoNOMIC BATTLE AMONG JAPAN, EUROPE, AND AMERICA 129-33, 149-51, 171-75 
(1992) (arguing that U.S. firms have specialized in short-term static efficiency at the expense of 
dynamic efficiency and have also overcentralized management, losing benefits of more par-
ticipatory decision systems). 
34. See HALBERSTAM, supra note 30, at 314. 
35. OMB's lack of substantive expertise provided a frequent cause for criticism. THOMAS 
MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE 
FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 281 (1991). 
36. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 7-11 
(1990); SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 81 ("[B]etween 1972 and 1985 the United States spent a total 
of no Jess than $632 billion for pollution control."). 
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Although not devoting most of their discussions directly to environ-
mental issues, Rose-Ackerman as well as Osborne and Gaebler advo-
cate approaches that have important implications for environmental 
law. 
A. Use of Economic Incentives 
Rose-Ackerman, like Osborne and Gaebler, advocates replacing 
our current environmental regulations with a system of economic in-
centives (Rose-Ackerman, pp. 128, 155-56, 191). To explain these ar-
guments, a little background on pollution regulation is necessary. 
Unfortunately, the current regulatory system is not easy to understand 
because the federal pollution statutes have grown almost as compli-
cated as the Internal Revenue Code. Basically, the Clean Water Act 
requires polluters to use the highest feasible degree of pollution con-
trol. The Clean Air Act has similar explicit requirements for new pol-
lution sources, but a different set of standards for existing polluters. In 
practice, however, existing polluters are often also held to the feasibil-
ity standard. 
Osborne and Gaebler, Rose-Ackerman, and other critics criticize 
three basic aspects of EP A's effort to mandate specific levels of pollu-
tion controls. First, this method of pollution control is inherently 
cumbersome (Osborne and Gaebler, p. 300). EPA must investigate 
pollution control technologies and economic conditions in each indi-
vidual industry to determine the best technology the industry can af-
ford. A major EPA rule may require tens of thousands of pages of 
documentation, including careful responses to dozens of arguments 
raised by the industry.37 Second, what Osborne and Gaebler call the 
"one size fits all" approach (p. 301), requiring the best possible 
method of pollution control for all sources, is sometimes quite waste-
ful. In one notorious case, the courts required two West Coast paper 
mills to install expensive pollution control equipment, although the 
pollution was harmlessly diluted by the Pacific Ocean. Only a special 
act of Congress rescued the two mills. 38 Third, according to the crit-
ics, the current approach to regulation asks EPA to perform a job that 
it is fundamentally incapable of doing. EPA cannot fully master the 
economics and technologies of dozens of industries, from petrochemi-
cals to steel to electric utilities. It is bound to make mistakes in both 
directions, asking more than some industries can ultimately achieve 
while letting others off too lightly.39 
37. The courts have done a great deal to make this process even more cumbersome than it 
has to be. See infra section Il.C. 
38. See Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 642 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
1053 (1981) (overturned by a special provision covering only those two paper mills,§ 301(m)(l) 
of the Clean Water Act, 28 U.S.C. § 3311(m)(l) (1988)). 
39. The crux of these criticisms is that EPA has the desire but not the information to regu· 
late, while industry has all the information but little incentive to use it. If regulations were 
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Economists have spent many years considering possible incentive 
systems that would avoid these flaws. The basic concept is to make 
pollution into a cost for the company, which the company will want to 
minimize like any other expense (Osborne and Gaebler, p. 302). Im-
posing a fee or tax on the pollutants released into the environment can 
achieve this "cost internalization" directly. Making companies pay 
for pollution permits can achieve it indirectly.40 
The arguments for these incentive schemes are powerful. Some 
promising efforts have been made at implementation, the most ambi-
tious being the new system of marketable sulfur-dioxide allowances 
under the 1990 Clean Air Act.41 But before we scrap our existing 
regulatory scheme, some countervailing arguments deserve 
consideration. 
To begin with, while incentive schemes sound terrific in theory, we 
should not be overly confident about translating that theory into prac-
tice. Real-world implementation of regulatory reform may raise sig-
nificant practical problems and conflict with other goals like equity.42 
Moreover, the actual legal enactments are likely to differ considerably 
from the elegant theoretical models, if only for political reasons. 
(Compare the intellectual elegance of the concept of an income tax 
with the notorious complexity of the Internal Revenue Code.) We 
cannot be sure that theoretical arguments for incentive schemes will 
apply equally to actual implementation.43 
Despite these concerns, incentive schemes do present exciting pos-
sibilities for making environmental protection more cost-effective. 
Unfortunately, as two leading economists in the field have pointed out, 
"[i]n spite of the potential importance of emissions trading as an alter-
tailored to individual plants, society could perhaps achieve the same levels of pollution control as 
the current regulatory approach, but at a much lower price. Society could then spend some of 
the savings on even higher levels of pollution control, benefiting industry while improving the 
environment. 
40. As discussed supra section I.A, quantifying the benefits of regulation is difficult; quanti-
fying environmental harms is equally difficult. As a result, setting an effluent fee or permit price 
equal to the harm done by a polluter is generally infeasible. Instead, the agency must first deter-
mine the desired level of pollution and then work backwards to ensure that the permit or fee 
system results in that pollution level. Consequently, incentive mechanisms in practice only ap-
proximate the concept of cost internalization. 
41. These provisions make up subchapter IV-A of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-
76510. For a briefoverview of these provisions, see ROGER w. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 375-76 (3d ed. 1991). 
42. For arguments in favor of technology-based standards on these grounds, see Howard 
Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and 
"Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1267 (1985); Jerry Mashaw, Imagining 
the Past: Remembering the Future, 1991 DUKE L.J. 711, 721-23; Joel A. Mintz, Economic Re-
form of Environmental Protection: A Brie/Comment on a Recent Debate, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 149, 153-54 (1991); Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 25, at 729. 
43. For example, the trading system for sulfur dioxide allowances seems to be off to a very 
slow start and may prove ineffectual. See Matthew L. Wald, Risk-Shy Utilities Avoid Trading 
Emission Credits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1993, at D2. 
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native to conventional regulatory approaches, surprisingly little effort 
has been spent evaluating the impact of this program."44 Extensive 
followup studies of existing incentive-based programs should be a high 
priority. Until these studies have been done, we should proceed cau-
tiously in replacing conventional regulation with incentive schemes. 
Moreover, the attack on conventional regulatory techniques has 
been too facile. Although conventional regulation has proved cumber-
some and difficult, such problems are not necessarily inherent. In par-
ticular, as discussed in the next two sections, other improvements in 
the regulatory process may be possible. 
B. Decentralizing Regulation 
Regardless of the general merits of incentive schemes, in some situ-
ations we probably have very little choice beyond conventional regula-
tions. We simply know too little to establish a reasonable incentive 
scheme for some pollutants. For practical reasons, other environmen-
tal problems may not lend themselves to incentive schemes, perhaps 
because effects vary too much depending on local settings or interac-
tions with other pollutants. We should therefore consider whether we 
could improve the regulatory process. 
In the last section, I considered one method of decentralizing pol-
lution control, whereby the task of determining plant-specific require-
ments is transferred from EPA to the private sector. Another 
possibility is to transfer more of the task to the states. As Professor 
Rose-Ackerman says, if properly implemented, "decentralization may 
promote freedom of choice, responsiveness, and desirable forms of in-
terjurisdictional competition" (p. 173). Ideally, a proper institutional 
structure would lead the states to compete with each other, and per-
haps with the federal government, in designing more effective and 
cheaper regulatory strategies. At the same time, we would also need 
safeguards to prevent competition from taking the destructive form of 
a "race to the bottom." 
The Clean Water Act illustrates the current situation. The key 
regulatory requirements are found in section 301, which requires 
achievement of a set of "effiuent limitations" based on various levels of 
technological control.45 EPA issues regulations establishing uniform 
effiuent limitations for categories of firms.46 Section 301 limitations 
are issued as industry-wide regulations by EPA. States play no role in 
44. Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of 
EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 109 (1989). 
45. 28 u.s.c. § 3311 (1988). 
46. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 415.220-415.227 (1992); see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 
v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) (upholding EPA authority to issue regulations for chemical indus-
try). In theory, variances are available for firms that deviate too far from the industry norm, but 
in reality EPA virtually never grants these variances. See Latin, supra note 42, at 1317. 
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establishing these standards, but if states meet certain criteria they can 
obtain permission to operate the permit program under section 402 of 
the Act.47 In theory, at least, this does not involve much discretion, 
because the federal regulations supply the crucial regulatory 
standards. 48 
The Supreme Court considered but ultimately rejected another ap-
proach to implementing the statute. Under this approach, which in-
dustry favored, EPA would have issued guidelines that provided 
ranges of effiuent limits for various industrial categories, as well as a 
list of factors to be used in making choices within that range. The 
state permit authority would then have chosen a limit for each individ-
ual plant within that range, subject to veto by EPA.49 The Court re-
jected this approach largely for statutory reasons, but it was also 
concerned about the approach's practicality: 
The [industry] view of the Act would place an impossible burden on 
EPA. It would require EPA to give individual consideration to the cir-
cumstances of each of the more than 42,000 discharges who have applied 
for permits ... and to issue or approve these permits well in advance of 
the 1977 deadline in order to give industry time to install the necessary 
pollution-control equipment. We do not believe that Congress would 
have failed so conspicuously to provide EPA with the authority needed 
to achieve the statutory goals. 50 
This was a highly sensible remark at the time of the Court's ruling, 
but it may make less sense today. To begin with, we now know that 
EPA's preferred approach also conspicuously failed to meet the 1977 
deadline; indeed, even today, effiuent limitations for some industries 
are not yet in place.51 More importantly, it is no longer clear that 
overseeing the issuance of 42,000 permits would be an impossible task. 
True, assessing the technological and economic basis of each permit 
individually would be a daunting task. But new methods of statistical 
quality control provide a promising alternative to uniform categorical 
standards or individualized permit review. As Osborne and Gaebler 
observe, "[w]e can generate, analyze, and communicate a thousand 
times more information than we could just a generation ago, for a frac-
tion of the cost" (p. 141). 
Efficient systems to oversee even 42,000 permits do not seem out of 
the question. Consider, for example, the vastly greater number of 
47. See Clean Water Act § 402(b); 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). 
48. EPA maintains two forms of control on state permit programs: it can veto individual 
permits, or it can withdraw approval for the entire state program. Withdrawing approval of a 
state program, however, is not a very credible threat, because doing so would require EPA itself 
to fund the expensive permit process at the expense of other programs. 
49. The industry position prevailed in the first appellate decision on the issue, CPC Intl. v. 
Train, SIS F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 197S). 
SO. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 132-33 (1977). 
SI. See FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 41, at 273-74. 
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Medicare claims or income tax returns that must be screened annu-
ally. To manage the permit-granting process, EPA might create a 
model to predict effluent limitations for plants having particular char-
acteristics. The model could be based on economic or engineering the-
ory, or it could incorporate statistical studies of actual permits from 
other states. Permits straying too far from the prediction would be 
automatically audited, as would a random sample of other permits. 52 
As an incentive, there could be a monetary penalty for rejected per-
mits (with a quick arbitration of any disputed claims). No doubt an 
expert on quality control could devise a much better system, but even 
this rough sketch suggests that a solution is feasible. 
This system would have several advantages over the current regu-
latory scheme. It would reduce the costs of "one size fits all" regula-
tion by allowing closer tailoring of effluent limits to the needs of 
individual plants. Also, because the EPA guidelines would be more 
flexible than the current regulations, they could justifiably be less pre-
cise and less heavily documented. This could help streamline the issu-
ance process and might encourage judges to ease the intrusiveness of 
judicial review. Finally, the permit limitations established by different 
states could provide valuable new information, so that EPA could ad-
just the standards based on experience. 53 
Potentially, even greater flexibility could be given to the states. Os-
borne and Gaebler are enthusiastic advocates of results-based govern-
ment (pp. 138-41). The ultimate goal of the Clean Water Act is 
cleaner water, not more elaborate pollution control, yet the regulatory 
system gives its primary attention to technology standards rather than 
water quality. Under the Clean Air Act, the states in theory have 
considerable leeway to set certain standards in whatever manner they 
like, so long as federal air quality standards are met. In practice, state 
discretion has unfortunately been subject to an increasing number of 
qualifications, the air quality targets are unrealistic, and the sanctions 
against noncomplying states are so draconian that EPA has resisted 
ever imposing them. 54 
Obvious risks lie in delegating too much authority to states that 
may lack the resources, expertise, or political will to implement inno-
vative environmental programs, but these risks are not insuperable. 
52. For an insightful analysis of a similar proposal for the use of statistical claim profiles in 
tort cases, see Glen 0. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 18 VA. 
L. REV. 1481 (1992). The authors rebut in some detail the argument that justice requires indi-
vidualized treatment, and their logic seems to extend to the permit context. 
53. For example, if states that are generally strict issue permits with relaxed requirements for 
some category of sources, EPA might want to consider whether its initial technological expecta-
tions were too high. Similarly, some states' issuance of unexpectedly strict permits might trigger 
a reappraisal in the opposite direction. 
54. Some of the difficulties of implementing the Clean Air Act are discussed in Howard 
Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL, L. 
1647 (1991). 
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One safeguard against inaction would be to authorize EPA to enter 
into contracts with particular states to create innovative programs. 
These contracts would only be available to states that had demon-
strated the capacity to run an effective regulatory program. The con-
tract would contain quantitative performance measures - specific 
levels of air or water quality to be met by particular dates. Failure to 
achieve these standards would result in financial penalties against the 
state55 or cancellation of the contract. Finally, minimum federal stan-
dards would remain in place as a safeguard against risks to public 
health or irreparable environmental damage. Again, an expert un-
doubtedly could design a more effective plan, but the basic concept 
seems workable. The result would encourage state innovation to find 
cheaper ways of meeting environmental goals. Successful state pro-
grams then could operate as models for other states or could become 
federal law. 
As with results-based approaches generally, reliable outcome 
measures are crucial to this scheme. Unfortunately, our pollution 
monitoring is strikingly inadequate. 56 Whether or not we adopt any of 
the decentralizing mechanisms I have discussed here, we urgently 
need better information about the current state of the environment. 
C. Improving Judicial Review 
Among her other proposals to improve the regulatory process, 
Rose-Ackerman endorses more searching judicial review of agency de-
cisions (pp. 39, 42). Like her advocacy of cost-benefit analysis, this 
proposal is designed to improve the rationality of the regulatory pro-
cess. Her suggestion, however, would merely exacerbate existing flaws 
in the administrative process. 57 
Obtaining more information and analysis seems obviously desira-
ble, but at some point it can become counterproductive. Again, de-
spite the obvious differences between commercial and governmental 
institutions, a business analogy is suggestive. Consider Halberstam's 
SS. In a more positive approach, the federal government might give grants, the amounts 
depending on quality of performance, to states with innovative programs. 
S6. See PERCIVAL ET. AL., supra note 2S, at 793, 866; Debra S. Knopman & Richard A. 
Smith, Twenty Years of the Clean Water Act, ENVIRONMENT, Jan./Feb. 1993, at 18-20, 34. With 
regard to toxics, EP A's information base was so weak that the huge discharges revealed by 
mandatory disclosures under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
"shocked" the agency. PERCIVAL ET. AL., supra note 2S, at 624. For a more recent survey of 
environmental monitoring, and calls for improvement, see COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: 22D ANNUAL REPORT 43-S6 (1992). 
S7. Administrative law scholars have engaged in extensive debate about whether judicial re-
view has become too intrusive. For a discussion and citations to the literature, see Robert 
Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years of Law and Politics, 
S4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 2SO n.2, 273-74, 301-02 (1991). For a historical overview of 
the evolution of administrative law, see Daniel Gifford, The New Deal Regulatory Model: A 
History of Criticisms and Refinements, 68 MINN. L. REV. 299 (1983). 
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account of an executive who helped delay Ford's manufacture of 
front-wheel drive vehicles: 
To many of his critics, he embodied the problem of the modern Ford 
company as created by the men of the Harvard Business School: too 
much information, too many options, too little feeling about the cars. 
"The trouble with you, Phil," Iacocca once told him, "is that you went 
to Harvard, where they told you not to take any action until you've got 
all of the facts. You've got ninety-five percent of them, but it's going to 
take you another six months to get that last five percent. And by the 
time you do, your facts will be out of date because the market has moved 
on you." ... He always wanted additional information, and each meet-
ing seemed to end not with a decision but a call for yet another meeting, 
where there could be even more information and more options. 58 
Unfortunately, the federal courts have often seemed determined to im-
pose this model of decisionmaking on regulatory agencies. 
In a recent book, Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst detail how judi-
cial obsession with obtaining exhaustive documentation derailed the 
federal auto safety program. They conclude that the "hard look" doc-
trine, under which judges closely scrutinize the administrative record 
to insure agency rationality, is ill conceived.59 In the environmental 
area, finding cases in which courts that demanded further documenta-
tion and more careful analysis overturned EP A's technical decisions is 
easy. In Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 60 for example, the Fifth Cir-
cuit overturned the agency's carefully considered asbestos regulations, 
effectively wrecking EP A's most serious effort to implement the Toxic 
Substances Control Act. Other judges have not hesitated to correct 
agencies on abstruse technical issues. 61 
Improved decisionmaking may seem worthwhile in any circum-
stance. In a world of limited staffs and budgets, however, improve-
ments in quality come only after expensive delays and reduced 
outputs. If we assume that the preregulatory status quo is unsatisfac-
tory, a quicker (though less accurate) regulatory process may be a 
preferable response. In addition, the delayed response risks the prob-
lem confronted by the auto executive described above. By the time all 
the data have been considered and all the analytical issues covered, the 
problem may have changed, leaving the proposals ill suited to fix it. In 
58. HALBERSTAM, supra note 30, at 516. 
59. See JERRY L. MAsHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 87-
102 (1990). 
60. 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
61. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992) (demanding that agency 
separately document health effects for each of 428 toxic substances, although OSHA argued that 
this was scientifically infeasible); State of Ohio v. EPA, 784 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1986) (rejecting 
EPA computer model); Gulf S. Insulation v. United States Consumer Prods. Safety Commn., 
701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1983) (second-guessing the agency on technical issues); see also Thomas 
O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on 'Deossifying' the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1400-
1403 (1992). 
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the environmental area, the agency may find that the scientific data or 
technological and economic constraints have shifted, leaving the 
agency with a choice between starting over or closing the record and 
adopting a potentially obsolete regulation. Mistakes are rarely irrevo-
cable in the regulatory arena, and the agency may do better to try a 
"quick and dirty" interim solution, to be improved when additional 
information arrives. 62 
Judicial review seems an unpromising way to improve the quality 
of an agency's technical judgments. A report from the National Acad-
emy of Science is far more likely to provide a useful evaluation of the 
merits of a proposed regulation than an opinion by an appellate judge. 
Of course, judicial review does serve other important purposes. It can 
help assure that statutory procedures have been followed, and judges 
can also correct agency misinterpretations of the law. But relying 
heavily on judges to evaluate technical judgments makes little more 
sense than appointing engineers to review legal issues. 
Another possible benefit of intensive judicial review is to reduce 
undue political influence (or other forms of bias) on agency deci-
sions.63 Within the range of reasonable outcomes, however, the 
agency remains free to take its preferred position; judicial review 
merely forces the agency to create a more elaborate record. Only 
when the outcome is wholly unjustifiable from a technical perspective 
is the agency constrained, and even then relatively uninformed judges 
may mistakenly uphold the agency. If preventing undue influence is 
the purpose, then we would do better to adopt administrative proce-
dures that assure public accountability (Rose-Ackerman, p. 41) than 
to have courts closely monitor the substance of agency decisions. 
Despite these shortcomings, judicial review of an agency's factual 
conclusions can help ensure at least the good faith of agency judg-
ments. When the agency announces that a statutory standard has or 
has not been met - but the agency has not made any effort to deter-
mine the facts - it fails to heed its statutory mandate. 64 Preventing 
agencies from wilfully ignoring their statutory mandates is an impor-
tant judicial role, but this function does not guarantee the best regula-
tions. Rather, it merely ensures that agencies exercise good-faith 
professional judgement. 
Wholesale abandonment of "hard look" review is unlikely and 
might be unwise. Although intensive judicial review is an inefficient 
way to improve regulation, it may be warranted when the risk of 
62. In short, striving for an unattainable level of rationality in decisionmaking may be 
counterproductive. See James E. Krier & Mark Brownstein, On Integrated Pollution Control, 22 
ENVTL. L. 119, 123-26 (1992). 
63. I put aside the question of when political influences should be considered "undue." 
64. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) 
(finding that agency rejected air bags for purely political reasons, without having made responsi-
ble professional judgment about feasibility). 
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agency error is especially grave. For example, when an agency's ac-
tion would be irreversible (as with threatening extinction of an endan-
gered species), a "harder look" may well be justified. Moreover, 
depending on the political circumstances and the agency's expertise, 
the credibility of its technical judgments may vary. Michael Blumm's 
findings regarding NEPA cases suggest one promising solution. Typi-
cally, courts uphold environmental impact statements unless the 
agency has failed to respond adequately to criticisms by other state or 
federal agencies. 65 Similarly, we might reserve the "hard look" doc-
trine for cases where the agency decision conflicts with the views of 
other government bodies or when the agency may cause irreparable 
injury. 
Whether or not we modify judicial review, we do need better ways 
of preventing politics from entering the decisionmaking process at the 
wrong points and of improving the technical quality of agency deci-
sions. Greater use of independent scientific expertise would help, as 
would better monitoring of results. After all, the true test of a regula-
tion is not whether it was made on a full record or bears a sufficiently 
analytic explanation, but whether it works. 
* * * 
During the past decade, a debate raged over whether or not to 
abandon government regulation. As Rose-Ackerman and Osborne 
and Gaebler insist, we need to move beyond that debate. Instead, we 
need to explore new ways of regulating more effectively and efficiently. 
Some of the proposals these authors present are more useful than 
others, but their efforts to move beyond the stale deregulation debate 
deserve applause. In environmental law and elsewhere, it is time to 
explore new approaches to regulation. 
65. See Michael C. Blumm & Stephen R. Brown, Pluralism and the Environment: The Role 
of Comment Agencies in NEPA Litigation, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 277, 281-83 (1990). 
